CS206 · Research prototype

Verifiable Commitment Game

RQ

Can cryptographic verification make strategic commitments trustworthy enough to sustain cooperation?

Browser demonstration · not a production blockchain

Round 1 of 6

Coordinate the data release

SHA-256 commitment
1 · Commit
2 · Respond
3 · Reveal
4 · Verify

Your firm and a partner must release compatible datasets. Cooperation creates shared value; exploiting the partner creates a private bonus.

Choose your private plan The partner cannot see it
Secret nonce Combined with your plan before hashing

Scripted comparison

Run the same six-round strategy under both conditions. This fixed model check separates mechanical verification from empirical claims about real organizations.

SHA-256 commitment3 switches blocked
Trusted rounds6 / 6
Joint payoff36
Informal promiseSwitches leave no proof
Trusted rounds3 / 6
Joint payoff28

Model-generated result from a fixed script, not field evidence. The comparison supports a testable hypothesis; it does not establish real-world causality or a formal Nash equilibrium.

Protocol and game logic

  1. Commit. Choose a private plan. In SHA-256 mode, the browser hashes plan + nonce and publishes only the digest.
  2. Respond. The simulated partner decides whether to cooperate using the current trust score and the strength of the enforcement condition—not your hidden plan.
  3. Reveal. Submit the original plan or try to replace it with the opposite plan while keeping the nonce.
  4. Verify. A matching digest confirms consistency. A mismatch exposes post-commitment switching and triggers the selected penalty.
  5. Interpret carefully. Cryptography can make a commitment inspectable. Whether this produces trust, welfare, legitimacy, or equilibrium behavior remains an economic and empirical question.